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CASES BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS
Managing Frozen Assets
at the International
Criminal Court
The Fallout of the Bemba Acquittal
Daley J. Birkett*
Abstract
On 8 June 2018, more than 10 years after his arrest, the Appeals Chamber of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) reversed Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo’s conviction by
the Trial Chamber for crimes against humanity and war crimes, acquitting him of all
charges. Soon after the start of his time in detention in The Hague, assets belonging to
Bemba were frozen by states across a number of jurisdictions at the request of the ICC.
Many of these assets remain frozen, more than 18 months after his acquittal. This
article examines the consequences of prolonged asset freezes by the ICC through the
lens of the Bemba case, demonstrating the existence of gaps in the legal framework
applicable to the management of frozen assets under the ICC Statute system and
suggesting possible responses thereto at the domestic and international levels.
1. Introduction
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is empowered by its constituent instru-
ment to request its states parties to identify, trace, freeze and seize the property
and assets of accused persons, ‘[w]here a warrant of arrest or a summons has
been issued’.1 More precisely, Article 57(3)(e) ICC Statute authorizes pre-trial
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1 Art. 57(3)(e) ICCSt.
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chambers to ‘seek the cooperation of States pursuant to article 93, paragraph
1 (k), to take protective measures for the purpose of forfeiture, in particular for
the ultimate benefit of victims’.2 To the extent that such requests, or deci-
sions discussing such requests, have been made publicly available, the ICC
can be seen to have exercised this power seven times in respect of persons
accused of committing crimes under its jurisdiction since the entry into force
of the ICC Statute. Such requests have been issued with respect to (i) Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo;3 (ii) Germain Katanga;4 (iii) Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui;5 (iv) Bosco
Ntaganda;6 (v) Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo;7 (vi) Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru
Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali;8 and (vii) Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo, Aime´ Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fide`le Babala
2 Ibid., Art. 93 ICCSt., which falls under Part IX ICCSt., titled ‘International cooperation and
judicial assistance’, provides, in relevant part, as follows: ‘(1) States Parties shall, in accordance
with the provisions of this Part and under procedures of national law, comply with requests by
the Court to provide the following assistance in relation to investigations or prosecutions: . . . (k)
The identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, property and assets and instru-
mentalities of crimes for the purpose of eventual forfeiture, without prejudice to the rights of
bona fide third parties’. On the ICC’s law and practice in the execution of ‘protective measures’,
see D.J. Birkett, ‘Pre-Trial ‘‘Protective Measures for the Purpose of Forfeiture’’ at the
International Criminal Court: Safeguarding and Balancing Competing Rights and Interests’,
32 Leiden Journal of International Law (LJIL) (2019) 585–602.
3 See Request to the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the purpose of obtaining the identi-
fication, tracing, freezing and seizure of property and assets belonging to Mr. Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo, Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06-22-tEN), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 9 March 2006; Request
to States Parties to the Rome Statute for the Identification, Tracing and Freezing or Seizure of
the Property and Assets of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06-62-
tEN), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 31 March 2006.
4 See Request to the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the purpose of obtaining the identi-
fication, tracing, freezing and seizure of the property and assets of Germain Katanga, Katanga
(ICC-01/04-01/07-7-tENG), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 6 July 2007.
5 See Demande adresse´e a` la re´publique de´mocratique du Congo en vue d’obtenir l’identification,
la localisation, le gel et la saisie des biens et avoirs de Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Request to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo for the purpose of obtaining the identification, tracing,
freezing and seizure of the property and assets of Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui), Ngudjolo Chui
(ICC-01/04-01/07-266), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 14 November 2007.
6 See Decision on the Prosecution Application for a Warrant of Arrest, Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/
06-1-Red-tENG), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 6 March 2007, at 35 and 36 (instructing the Registry to
prepare and transmit cooperation requests to the competent authorities in the DRC, Uganda
and Rwanda ‘to identify, trace and freeze or seize the property and assets belonging to Bosco
Ntaganda at the earliest opportunity, without prejudice to the rights of third parties’).
7 See Decision et demande en vue d’obtenir l’identification, la localisation, le gel et la saisie des
biens et avoirs adresse´es a la Republique portugaise (Decision and Request to the Republic of
Portugal for the purpose of obtaining the identification, tracing, freezing and seizure of property
and assets), Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08-8), Pre-Trial Chamber III, 27 May 2008 (‘Bemba
Freezing Request’).
8 See Decision Ordering the Registrar to Prepare and Transmit a Request for Cooperation to the
Republic of Kenya for the Purpose of Securing the Identification, Tracing and Freezing or Seizure
of Property and Assets of Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed
Hussein Ali, Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali (ICC-01/09-02/11-42), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 5 April
2011.
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Wandu and Narcisse Arido.9 Additionally, in November 2011, the then ICC
Prosecutor reported to the United Nations (UN) Security Council that the ICC
had transmitted ‘requests for assistance to Libya, State Parties, and five UN
Security Council non-State Parties to identify, trace, seize and freeze all the per-
sonal assets belonging to [Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi]’.10
The assets frozen by states pursuant to requests issued by the ICC under
Article 57(3)(e) ICC Statute can be put to a number of uses during the course
of proceedings and in the event of a conviction. These purposes include the
payment of defence fees and, if the Prosecutor secures a conviction, the pay-
ment of fines, orders for forfeiture and reparations to victims.11 But these assets
cannot be used for the latter three purposes where the ICC acquits an accused
person,12 who ought to be able to regain control over the frozen assets.
Therefore, regardless of whether the proceedings lead to a conviction or an
acquittal, there is a clear interest in maintaining the value of the assets while
they are frozen, for the benefit of the accused if he or she is acquitted or for the
benefit of victims in the event of a conviction and consequent reparations
order.
If not properly managed, frozen assets can lose value, thus thwarting the
purposes behind the application of protective measures under Article 57(3)(e)
ICC Statute. This potential decrease in value is arguably a greater threat in the
ICC Statute system than at the national level, where many state authorities
possess similar powers to the ICC with respect to asset freezing.13 This is be-
cause criminal proceedings on the international plane generally take
9 See Warrant of arrest for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aime´ Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques
Mangenda Kabongo, Fide`le Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Bemba Gombo, Kilolo Musamba,
Mangenda Kabongo, Babala Wandu and Arido (ICC-01/05-01/13-1-tENG), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 20
November 2013, 17 (‘requesting the States which will arrest the persons concerned, and any
other relevant State which may be identified, to locate and freeze their assets’).
10 Prosecutor’s statement to the United Nations Security Council on the situation in Libya, pursuant to
UNSCR 1970 (2011), 2 November 2011, § 13.
11 Decision on the ‘Requeˆte de la de´fense aux fins de leve´e du gel des avoirs de Monsieur Aime´
Kilolo Musamba’, Bemba Gombo, Musamba, Mangenda Kabongo, Babala Wandu and Arido (ICC-
01/05-01/13-1485-Red), Trial Chamber VII, 17 November 2015 (‘Kilolo Lifting Decision’), §§
17–20. For analysis, see Birkett, supra note 2; C. Ferstman, ‘Cooperation and the International
Criminal Court: The Freezing, Seizing and Transfer of Assets for the Purpose of Reparations’, in
O. Bekou and D.J. Birkett (eds), Cooperation and the International Criminal Court: Perspectives from
Theory and Practice (Brill Nijhoff, 2016) 234–237, at 227 (analysing the Lubanga and Kenyatta
cases).
12 Pursuant to Arts 75(2) and 77 ICCSt., the ICC can only order fines, forfeiture of property and
assets and/or reparations directly against a convicted person. See also Final decision on the
reparations proceedings, Situation in the Central African Republic (ICC-01/05-01/08-3653), Trial
Chamber III, 3 August 2018 (‘Bemba Reparations Decision’), § 3 (‘The Chamber agrees with
the submissions made that no reparations order can be made against Mr Bemba under Article
75 of the Statute. The Chamber must respect the limitations of this Court and recalls that it can
only address compensation for harm suffered as a result of crimes when the person standing
trial for his or her participation in those crimes has been found guilty.’).
13 See Part 3.
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significantly longer than those conducted at the domestic level.14 The ICC
acknowledges this prospective problem in a booklet published in 2017 on
financial investigations and asset recovery: ‘[b]ecause assets are frozen during
the entirety of ICC proceedings, their value could significantly decrease by the
time they can be sold. Therefore, consultation with States at the very early
stage is crucial to avoid the devaluation of assets frozen on behalf of the
Court.’15 But the ICC-issued booklet provides no guidance on what such bilat-
eral consultations might involve.
This article examines the implications of prolonged asset freezes by the ICC
through the lens of the proceedings in the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo. The Bemba case provides a suitable case study through which to con-
duct the present analysis because, at the time of his arrest, Bemba was in
possession of a broad portfolio of assets, some of which were frozen by states at
the request of the ICC in accordance with the Article 57(3)(e) ICC Statute
procedure. The article demonstrates that gaps exist in the legal framework
applicable to the management of assets under the ICC Statute system and
suggests possible responses thereto at the domestic and international levels.
In order to realize these aims, the article is subdivided into five parts. Part 2
elaborates the importance of the meticulous management of assets in view of
the Bemba case, providing a procedural history of the case from his arrest in
2008 to his acquittal in 2018 as it pertains to the freezing of his assets. Part 3
turns to the procedures available under several States’ national implementing
legislation for the proper management of assets frozen or seized at the request
of the ICC. Part 4 examines possible steps that could be taken at the inter-
national level to respond to certain issues identified in Part 2 as concerns the
management of Bemba’s assets. Finally, Part 5 offers some concluding remarks
on the management of accused persons’ frozen assets at the behest of the ICC
in view of its first comprehensive experience thereof in the Bemba case, ques-
tioning, inter alia, whether sufficient use is being made of the provisions in the
ICC Statute that provide for (urgent) consultations between states and the
Court.
14 For data, see A. Smeulers, B. Hola, and T. van den Berg, ‘Sixty-five Years of International
Criminal Justice: The Facts and Figures’, 13 International Criminal Law Review (2013) 7–41, at
16–18; J. Galbraith, ‘The Pace of International Criminal Justice’, 31 Michigan Journal of
International Law (2009) 79–143, at 112–127. For further discussion of the length of proceed-
ings at international(ized) criminal tribunals, see A. Whiting, ‘In International Criminal
Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can Be Justice Delivered’, 50 Harvard International Law Journal
(2009) 323–364, at 323–330 (and footnotes thereto).
15 ICC, ‘Financial Investigations and Recovery of Assets’, November 2017, available online at
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/other/Freezing_Assets_Eng_Web.pdf (visited 1 June 2020), at 13.
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2. The Bemba Case
A. (Un)freezing Bemba’s Assets
On 24 May 2008, Belgian authorities executed an arrest warrant by the ICC,16
arresting Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo near Brussels.17 At the time of his arrest,
Bemba was reported to be a ‘millionaire’,18 in control of a ‘large business
empire’19 and owning luxury assets in a number of states. These were reported
to include a villa in the Alarve in southern Portugal,20 and a private jet
previously belonging to Mobutu Sese Seko, the former President of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).21 Indeed, Bemba was characterized
by ICC Trial Chamber III as follows: ‘clearly a man of considerable means, in
the sense that he appears to ‘‘own’’, or to have a proprietary interest in,
various kinds of property (e.g. buildings, cars, companies), and there are
bank accounts held in his sole name, in a number of different countries’.22
According to a claim for compensation filed by Mr Bemba, to which the author
will return,23 among the assets frozen by states following his arrest at the
request of the Court were bank accounts and properties in Belgium, the
DRC and Portugal, as well as a boat in the latter.24
Three days after Bemba was apprehended, taking into consideration arguments
raised by the Prosecutor in his application for an arrest warrant for Bemba,25 and
16 See Warrant of Arrest for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08-1-tENG),
Pre-Trial Chamber III, 23 May 2008; Decision to Unseal the Warrant of Arrest for Mr
JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08-5-tENG), Pre-Trial Chamber III,
24 May 2008.
17 Agence France-Presse, ‘Congo Ex-Official Is Held in Belgium on War Crimes Charges’, The New
York Times, 25 May 2008, available online at www.nytimes.com/2008/05/25/world/africa/
25congo.html (visited 1 June 2020).
18 Ibid.
19 M. Simons, ‘Jean-Pierre Bemba, Congolese Politician, Appears in Hague court’, The New York
Times, 4 July 2008, available online at www.nytimes.com/2008/07/04/world/africa/04iht-
05hague.14247286.html (visited 1 June 2020).
20 See B.F. Pires, ‘Last Stop Faro?’ Algarve 123, 15 March 2012 (copy on file with the author). See
also ‘Written Question by Ana Maria Gomes (PSE) to the Commission, Subject: Jean-Pierre
Bemba’s Residence in Portugal’, European Parliament, 3 June 2008, P-3176/08 (‘According to
the 26.5.2008 issue of the daily newspaper Dia´rio de Notı´cias . . . Bemba, former Vice-President
of the CAR, principal political rival of President Kabila, and leader of the MLC, had been living
since April 2007 in a luxurious refuge in the Quinta do Lago in Faro’).
21 See Pires, ibid.
22 Redacted version of ‘Decision on legal assistance for the accused’, Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-
01/08-567-Red), Trial Chamber III, 26 November 2009 (‘Bemba Assistance Decision’), § 1.
23 See Part 2.B.
24 Public Redacted Version of ‘Mr. Bemba’s claim for compensation and damages’, Situation in the
Central African Republic (ICC-01/05-01/08-3673-Red), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 11 March 2019
(‘Bemba Claim for Compensation and Damages’), § 127. Mr Bemba also notes the freezing,
‘apparently without judicial order’, of aircraft and vehicles in the DRC and Portugal, a boat in
the DRC, and a property in Portugal. See § 128.
25 See Bemba Freezing Request, supra note 7, at §§ 1 and 5. See also Prosecutor’s Application for
Warrant of Arrest under Art. 58, Situation in the Central African Republic (ICC-01/05-01/08-26-
Red), Pre-Trial Chamber III, 9 May 2008.
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observing Article 57(3)(e) ICC Statute and Article 93(1)(k) ICC Statute, among
other provisions, Pre-Trial Chamber III called on ‘the Republic of Portugal to
take, in accordance with the procedures provided for in its domestic legislation,
all necessary measures to identify, locate, freeze or seize the property and assets of
Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo located on its territory, including his movable or
immovable property, accounts or shares, subject to the rights of bona fide third
parties’.26 The ICC delivered similar requests to other states, which are not (yet)
publicly available.27 It has, however, been made evident in later filings that
Belgium and Cape Verde each received such requests for cooperation from the
ICC under Article 93(1)(k) ICC Statute. It is to these filings, in which Bemba
brings the issue of the devaluation of his assets because of the ICC-requested
freeze to the attention of the Court, that the present discussion now turns.
As a result of the execution of the freezing requests, Bemba was unable to
access his property and assets in order to meet his defence expenses, among
other costs. Trial Chamber III found that he consequently did not have ‘suffi-
cient means to pay for his defence’28 and ordered the Registry ‘[t]o provide
funding in the sum of E30,150 a month’ to allow him to pay such fees.29
On 8 June 2018, more than 10 years after his arrest, the Appeals Chamber
of the ICC reversed Bemba’s conviction by ICC Trial Chamber III for crimes
against humanity and war crimes,30 acquitting him of all charges.31 On 17
July 2018, Trial Chamber III issued an order instructing Bemba to repay the
fees, totalling more than E1.8 million, which had been advanced to him by
the Court to fund his defence expenses.32 Bemba subsequently filed an appli-
cation before the same Trial Chamber,33 requesting, inter alia, that: (i) the ICC
reclassify all filings concerning his frozen assets so as to make them available
26 See Bemba Freezing Request, supra note 7, at Disposition (‘demande a` la Re´publique portugaise
de prendre, conforme´ment aux proce´dures pre´vues par sa le´gislation nationale, toutes les
mesures ne´cessaires afin d’identifier, localiser, geler ou saisir les biens et avoirs de M. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo qui se trouvent sur son territoire, y compris ses biens meubles ou
immeubles, ses comptes bancaires ou ses parts sociales, sous re´serve des droits des tiers de
bonne foi’) (author’s translation).
27 Bemba Assistance Decision, supra note 22, § 10. The states to which requests were issued are
redacted.
28 Ibid., § 105.
29 Ibid., § 111. This sum was increased in 2010 to E42,701 per month. See Redacted Version of
Decision on the Defence Application for Review of the Registrar’s Decision of 15 October 2010
on the Application for Adjustment of the Expenses and Fees of the Defence (ICC-01/05-01/08-
1007-Conf), Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08-1007-Red), Trial Chamber III, 7 December 2010,
§ 39. After the trial phase ended, the amount was reduced to E24,750 per month. See Public
redacted version of ‘Order in relation to advanced legal assistance fees’, Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/
05-01/08-3651-Red), Trial Chamber III, 17 July 2018 (‘Bemba Order for Repayment’), fn. 4.
30 Judgment pursuant to Art. 74 of the Statute, Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08-3343), Trial
Chamber III, 21 March 2016.
31 Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s ‘Judgment
pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’, Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Red A), Appeals
Chamber, 8 June 2018.
32 Bemba Order for Repayment, supra note 29, § 7. The exact sum was E1,886,736.87.
33 Public Redacted Version of ‘Preliminary application for reclassification of filings, disclosure,
accounts and partial unfreezing of Mr. Bemba’s assets’, Situation in the Central African
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to him and (ii) order the states in which assets belonging to him had been
frozen to supply him with an account thereof.34 In the application, Bemba
argued that he required such an account because of the ‘deterioration, depre-
ciation or destruction [of his property] during its time in the custody of other
states or institutions, whilst held on trust by them for its rightful owner’.35 The
application continues: ‘[t]he orders should be made expeditiously, to mitigate
the losses Mr. Bemba continues to suffer as a result of the freezing of his
assets.’36 Importantly, Bemba argued that, following his acquittal, the statu-
tory basis for the freeze ceased to exist and that, in order to repay money
borrowed from the ICC’s Registry for the partial payment of his legal fees, the
freezing orders should be lifted.37 Bemba also contended that, with the freezing
orders having been given effect by states as a result of judicial decisions, a
judicial decision was required ‘to reverse the effects of those orders’.38
Trial Chamber III noted Bemba’s application and ordered the Registry to file
observations on the requests therein,39 to which the Registry duly
responded.40 In its observations, the Registry opposed the application for the
reason that, in its opinion, reclassifying the documents would have no impact
on Bemba’s capacity to repay the fees owed to the ICC.41 The Registry further
observed that, in the absence of a determination on the matter by the Appeals
Chamber, if the legal basis for the execution of the freezing requests ceased to
exist, as Bemba had argued in his original application, ‘the protective measures
taken at the national level would be null and void’42 and that reclassification
Republic (ICC-01/05-01/08-3654-Red), Trial Chamber III, 30 October 2010 (‘Bemba Unfreezing
Application’).
34 Ibid., § 54. See also § 53 (‘. . . freezing another person’s property creates fiduciary duties to
account for it. It is not, nor was it, Mr Bemba’s obligation to trace and identify his own
property, nor to point out and protest about the continuing illegality involved in the freezing
of his assets.’).
35 Ibid., § 4.
36 Ibid., § 5.
37 Ibid., §§ 25–37. Mr Bemba also observed that his contractual situation with the Registry
concerning the fees advanced to him thereby had no bearing on the question of discharging
the freezing orders and that there was no reason to doubt that his cooperation would be
forthcoming in this regard. See ibid., §§ 38–44.
38 Ibid., § 1.
39 Public redacted version of ‘Decision on the Defence’s preliminary application for reclassification
of filings, disclosure, accounts and partial unfreezing of Mr Bemba’s assets’, 24 August 2018,
Situation in the Central African Republic (ICC-01/05-01/08-3655-Red), Trial Chamber III, 16
November 2018. Trial Chamber III noted ‘that the outstanding legal assistance debt is based on
a contractual obligation between the Court and Mr Bemba, . . . [and] consider[ed] the Registry
to be the competent body to conduct and arrange the repayment process in the way it sees fit,
in consultation with Mr Bemba’. Ibid., § 9. The Trial Chamber, therefore, instructed Mr Bemba
to ‘direct further communication with respect to the repayment, if any, to the Registry’. Ibid.
40 Public Redacted Version of ‘Registry’s Observations on the Defence Request for Reclassification of
Information relating to Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo’s Assets’, 3 September 2018, Situation in
the Central African Republic (ICC-01/05-01/08-3656-Red2), Trial Chamber III, 7 December 2018.
41 Ibid., §§ 5 and 6.
42 Ibid., § 7. The Registry also observed that consulting with all relevant states would be ‘tre-
mendously time-consuming’. Ibid., § 8.
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would be of no import. Finally, the Registry noted that it had transferred more
than E2.2 million to Mr Bemba, with over E2 million of this amount deriving
from a cooperation request issued by the ICC to Cape Verde in 2014.43 Bemba
filed a response to the Registry’s observations, in which he argued as follows:
Those who take possession of other people’s property, thereby hold that property on trust for
that other person, the beneficiary or legal owner of the property. As trustees, they have
duties to account for the property they have taken (which cannot be derogated), and to
protect and preserve it until it is returned. Those basic and fundamental principles are
reflected in the rules and protocols that apply to prosecuting authorities who take possession
of property within the context of criminal proceedings. . . . The same principles apply to all
property effectively taken from Mr. Bemba . . .. Those who freeze and seize assets thereby
become trustees of those assets for the lawful owner of them with all the ancillary fiduciary
responsibilities to account for what has been seized and to preserve and protect it.44
Mr Bemba also observed that the ongoing freezing of his assets, including items of
which the Registry was unaware,45 had rendered his family members unable to
exercise their rights over real property and to access bank accounts.46 Mr Bemba
also submitted that, with the Registry having conceded that the orders are without
any legal basis and therefore ‘null and void’,47 it ought to inform interested states
thereof.48 Further, Mr Bemba reiterated that the relationship between the value
of his frozen property and the funds advanced to him by the ICC to finance his
defence expenses has ‘no bearing on the classification of filings or the duty to
account for his property’.49 In its submissions filed in response to Mr Bemba’s
observations, the Registry restated that the Appeal Chamber made no pronounce-
ment as regards the protective measures against Bemba’s assets in its judgment
acquitting Mr Bemba, nor did it order the Registry to alert states ‘with pending
cooperation requests’ of the judgment.50 Nonetheless, the Registry confirmed that
it would inform the relevant states of the end of the proceedings in the cases51
43 Ibid., § 13. The exact amount that the ICC had transferred to Mr Bemba was E2,277,270.61,
with E2,067,982 stemming from the May 2014 transfer from the Cape Verdean authorities to
the Court.
44 Public Redacted version of ‘Response to Redacted version of the Registry’s Observations on Mr.
Bemba’s Request for Reclassification of Information relating to Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo’s
Assets’, Situation in the Central African Republic (ICC-01/05-01/08-3657-Red), Trial Chamber III,
30 October 2018, §§ 1 and 3 (footnotes omitted).
45 Ibid., § 8. Mr Bemba observed that the Registry’s records were insufficient for him to identify
which of his assets were frozen. Ibid., § 7. Mr Bemba further contended that he ‘cannot be
expected to trace his own assets . . . It is the duty of the Court to undo what it has done’. Ibid.,
§ 9.
46 Ibid., § 10.
47 Ibid., § 11.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., § 17. See also Bemba Unfreezing Application, supra note 33, §§ 38–41.
50 Public Redacted Version of ‘Registry’s Submissions in relation to Protective Measures
imposed on Mr Bemba’s Assets’, 21 September 2018, Situation in the Central African Republic
(ICC-01/05-01/08-3658-Red2), Trial Chamber III, 7 December 2018 (‘Registry Submissions’),
§ 5.
51 In separate proceedings, Mr Bemba was convicted of offences against the administration of
justice and fined E300,000. See Decision on Sentence pursuant to Art. 76 of the Statute,
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against Mr Bemba.52 The Registry also sought guidance from Trial Chamber III as
to whether such notification of Bemba’s acquittal ‘would mean that the protective
measures taken on the basis of the Chamber’s requests would be null and void’.53
Mr Bemba filed a further response to the Registry’s submissions on 8 October
2018,54 in which he reiterated several of his earlier submissions. Of particular
note for the purposes of the present analysis, Bemba submitted that the
Registry’s suggestion that his assets should remain frozen because of his contrac-
tual debt to the ICC is ‘unfortunate, unfair and illegal’55 and conflated the juris-
diction of Trial Chamber III, which is seized of the instant proceedings, and Trial
Chamber VII, which ordered his fine for offences against the administration of
justice.56 Mr Bemba also contended that the impact of ongoing asset freeze ‘is
becoming cruel and inhumane and potentially interfering with his right to family
life’.57 Mr Bemba thus requested an expeditious resolution by the ICC.58
Trial Chamber III issued its decision on 20 November 2018.59 Having first
confirmed that the ICC cooperation regime is structured such that ‘the Court
itself does not order the freezing or seizure of assets, but rather orders that
Bemba Gombo, Kilolo Musamba, Kabongo, Babala Wandu and Arido (ICC-01/05-01/13-2123-
Corr), Trial Chamber VII, 22 March 2017, at Disposition. The fine was confirmed in
Decision Re-sentencing Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Mr Aime´ Kilolo Musamba and Mr
Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Bemba Gombo, Kilolo Musamba, Mangenda Kabongo, Babala
Wandu and Arido (ICC-01/05-01/13-2312), Trial Chamber VII, 17 September 2018, at
Disposition.
52 Registry Submissions, supra note 50, § 8. According to the Registry, ‘It is the Registry’s under-
standing that the judicial authority that lies with a Chamber, pursuant to articles 57(3)(e) and
93(1)(k) of the Statute, to issue requests for cooperation to impose protective measures on
assets at the domestic level necessarily also includes the authority to lift such protective
measures. Unless otherwise instructed, the Registry understands its role in this context to be
limited to the transmission of the requests for cooperation between the Chamber and the
relevant states, in accordance with rule 176(2) of the Rules.’ Ibid., § 6.
53 Registry Submissions, supra note 51, § 9.
54 Public Redacted version of ‘Mr. Bemba’s response to the ‘‘Redacted version of Registry’s
Submissions in relation to Protective Measures imposed on Mr Bemba’s Assets’’’, Situation in
the Central African Republic (ICC-01/05-01/08-3659-Red), Trial Chamber III, 30 October 2018.
55 Ibid., § 7. According to Bemba, ‘[t]he frozen property and assets in question were frozen in
order to preserve them so they could be used, in the event of a conviction, for a reparations
process.’ Ibid.
56 Ibid., § 6.
57 Ibid., § 11.
58 Ibid., § 15 (‘States and institutions continue to execute freezing orders imposed at the request of
the ICC four months after Mr. Bemba’s acquittal, amounting to an unlawful interference with
his personal property, and the personal property of an unknown number of third parties. Mr.
Bemba’s original request for the reclassification of all material relevant to the freezing orders
and an order to the relevant states for a full accounting of seized and frozen property has now
been pending for seven weeks. With every day that passes, the financial and economic loss
resulting from the freezing of this property necessarily increases.’).
59 Public redacted version of ‘Decision on Mr Bemba’s preliminary application for reclassification of
filings, disclosure, accounts, and partial unfreezing of Mr Bemba’s assets and the Registry’s
Request for guidance’, 18 October 2018, Situation in the Central African Republic (ICC-01/05-01/
08-3660-Red2), Trial Chamber III, 20 November 2018 (‘Bemba Unfreezing Decision’).
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cooperation requests be sent to States from them to do so’,60 Trial Chamber III
found that ‘the lifting of coercive measures, including the unfreezing of assets,
must be done under domestic law’.61 Trial Chamber III also emphasized that, in
the aftermath of Bemba’s acquittal by the Appeals Chamber, ‘there is no longer
any investigation or prosecution against [him] . . . and States are thus under no
obligation to comply with any of the standing requests for cooperation’.62 The
Trial Chamber therefore confirmed that it would be for the Registry to inform
interested states of the consequences of the acquittal, which, in turn, ought to
lead to appropriate action by national authorities under domestic law.63 Having
dismissed Mr Bemba’s application for the reclassification of documents,64 Trial
Chamber III confirmed that the repayment of his fine ought to be addressed by
the Registry in consultation with Trial Chamber VII.65 Trial Chamber III made
no explicit findings as concerns the claims made by Mr Bemba regarding the
depreciation of his assets and his right to family life.
On 10 December 2018, counsel for Mr Bemba filed a request to Trial
Chamber III to partially reconsider its decision,66 in which he argued, inter
alia, that the relevant states had refused to respond to his requests as regards
his frozen assets.67 ‘In Mr. Bemba’s submission, especially given the urgency of
the current situation, the effective impasse in the unfreezing of his assets, and
the fact that almost five months have now lapsed since his acquittal’,68 Trial
Chamber III ought to partially reconsider its decision and/or grant the relief
sought in this request.69 At the time of writing, there have been no further
submissions concerning the frozen assets.70
60 Ibid., § 11.
61 Ibid., § 12. The Trial Chamber continued: ‘an acquittal or other cessation of proceedings does
not render the original cooperation requests nor the coercive measures invalid, null or void.
The cooperation requests issued in this case remain, but cease to have effect in the sense that
States are no longer required to comply with them, for instance by keeping any assets frozen.
This, however, does not mean that assets are automatically released in the requested State. It is
rather for the State to determine what action to take under domestic law as a result of the
conclusion of its obligation to assist the Court through the freezing of assets.’ Ibid., § 13.
62 Ibid., § 15. (Emphasis in original).
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., §§ 16–18. The Trial Chamber observed that it ‘does not have the power to order States to,
for instance, ‘‘provide a full accounting of the property frozen,’’ as requested by [counsel for Mr
Bemba]’. Ibid., § 18.
65 Ibid., § 21. Trial Chamber III added that ‘the Court’s legal framework does not prohibit the
Registry from seeking States’ voluntary cooperation in securing the repayment of the advanced
legal assistance fees’ (emphasis in original). Ibid., at § 20. The Trial Chamber did, however,
caution ‘that States must at all times be made aware that the cooperation obligation under
Article 86 of the Statute would not be applicable to such requests’. Ibid.
66 Public Redacted Version of ‘Urgent request for partial reconsideration and associated orders’,
Situation in the Central African Republic (ICC-01/05-01/08-3663-Red), Trial Chamber III, 10
December 2018.
67 Ibid., § 33. In his request, Mr Bemba also provided ‘with greater specificity the information and
documents for which reclassification is being sought’. Ibid., § 32.
68 Ibid., § 2.
69 Ibid.
70 This article was completed on 1 June 2020. All information is current as of this date.
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B. Bemba’s Claim for Compensation and Damages
On 11 March 2019, counsel for Mr Bemba filed a claim for compensation and
damages under Article 85 ICC Statute, which governs compensation to an
arrested or convicted person.71 Part of this claim pertains to his assets.72 In
short, Mr Bemba claims that the ICC acted negligently in seizing and freezing
his assets, as well as in managing them after their freezing.73 The total amount
of damages sought by Mr Bemba is E42.4 million.74 In his submission, after
detailing the assets seized and/or frozen at the Court’s request,75 Bemba claims
that frozen assets ought to be properly managed in order to avoid deterioration
in their value76 and that the ICC had a duty as concerns his assets.77 Bemba
further alleges that the Court was negligent in executing this duty,78 that he
has suffered loss as a consequence of the Court’s negligence (or breach of
fiduciary duty)79 and that, for this reason, the ICC must provide him with a
remedy.80
On 6 May 2019, the Prosecutor filed her response to Mr Bemba’s claim for
compensation and damages.81 In her response, only a small part of which
addresses the alleged loss to his seized or frozen assets,82 the Prosecutor refutes
Bemba’s claim that the purported loss resulting from the seizure of his assets at
the Court’s request is sufficient to satisfy the criteria of Article 85 ICC
Statute.83 The Prosecutor also challenges Bemba’s private law claim against
the ICC for the allegedly negligent management of his assets.84 Notably, the
Prosecutor also contests Mr Bemba’s understanding of the ICC cooperation
regime as it concerns the freezing and seizure of assets.85 In short, the
71 Art. 85 ICCSt.
72 Bemba Claim for Compensation and Damages, supra note 24, §§ 123–165.
73 Ibid., § 6. See also ibid., §§ 123–165.
74 Ibid., § 125.
75 Ibid., §§ 126–132.
76 Ibid., §§ 133–138.
77 Ibid., §§ 139–142.
78 Ibid., §§ 143–150.
79 Ibid., §§ 151–153.
80 Ibid., §§ 154–165.
81 Public redacted version of ‘Prosecution’s response to Mr Bemba’s claim for compensation and
damages’, 6 May 2019, Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08-3680-Red), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 6
May 2019.
82 Ibid., §§ 83–102. The Prosecutor confines the majority of her response to arguments concern-
ing Mr Bemba’s failure to discharge his burden under Art. 85 ICCSt., the conduct of her office
and that of Trial Chamber III, the role of the Legal Representative of Victims and the legality
and propriety of his detention.
83 Ibid., § 84, arguing that Bemba fails to demonstrate a ‘grave and manifest miscarriage of
justice’, as required by Art. 85(3) ICCSt., and that, absent such a determination, Bemba cannot
rely on Rule 175 ICC RPE as a ground upon which a claim for compensation can be founded.
See also ibid., §§ 88–90.
84 Ibid., § 85, submitting that Mr Bemba’s arguments as concerns a private law claim are beyond
the scope of proceedings under Art. 85 ICCSt. and ought to be dismissed in limine. See also ibid.,
§§ 96–102, contesting the private law nature of Bemba’s claim that the Court negligently
managed his assets.
85 Ibid., §§ 92–95.
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Prosecutor endorses the opinion of Trial Chamber III as articulated in
the proceedings concerning the unfreezing of Bemba’s assets, namely that
the Court transmits requests for cooperation to states, who then decide how
to proceed in the execution and lifting of coercive measures pursuant to their
respective domestic law.86 According to the Prosecutor, ‘[in] this context, . . . a
demarcation of responsibility between the Court and States Parties is appropri-
ate given that it is the states which are equipped with the necessary laws,
regulations and mechanisms to carry out the freezing and seizure of assets.’87
On the same day, the Registry submitted its observations on Bemba’s claim
for compensation and damages.88 Among other submissions:
[t]he Registry observes that, notwithstanding that there may be follow-up to the execution
of cooperation requests on freezing or seizure of assets, a duty to manage or ‘‘fiduciary duty
to preserve assets’’, is not supported by the Court’s legal framework. The Defence appears to
confound any such ‘‘follow-up’’ on the execution of its cooperation requests with the states’
responsibility in connection with the execution of these requests under their respective
national laws.89
The Registry further emphasized its limited role as a facilitator in the exe-
cution of cooperation requests between the Court’s judiciary and the requested
state(s).90 The Registry also stressed the dependence of the ICC on state
authorities and their national implementing legislation in the context of the
Rome Statute cooperation regime91 and noted that the requested states were
cognizant of their obligation to manage the assets they were asked to freeze or
seize on behalf of the ICC in the instant case.92 Notably, the Registry specified
that the Portuguese authorities responsible for managing some of Bemba’s
frozen assets, including his Boeing 727-100 plane that was parked at Faro
airport at the time of his arrest, have ‘never consulted the Court under articles
96(2) or 100 of the Statute to explain any difficulties [they] may have encoun-
tered to manage the said assets located in Portugal once frozen or seized’.93
On 9 May 2019, at the request of counsel for Mr Bemba,94 Pre-Trial
Chamber II convened a hearing between the parties to the compensation
proceedings, namely the Prosecutor and Mr Bemba.95 Counsel for Mr Bemba
emphasized the indiscriminate nature of the freezing orders implemented at the
86 Ibid., §§ 92 and 93. See also Bemba Unfreezing Decision, supra note 59, §§ 11 and 12.
87 Ibid., § 94.
88 Public Redacted Version of the ‘Registry’s Observations on the Defence Compensation Claim’,
Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08-3681-Red3), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 6 May 2019.
89 Ibid., § 15.
90 Ibid., §§ 17–23. See also Rule 176 ICC RPE.
91 Ibid., §§ 27–30.
92 Ibid., §§ 31–33.
93 Ibid., § 33.
94 See Bemba Claim for Compensation and Damages, supra note 24, §169. For the order conven-
ing the hearing, among other issues, see Order on the conduct of the proceedings related to ‘Mr
Bemba’s claim for compensation and damages’, Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08-3675), Pre-
Trial Chamber II, 14 March 2019.
95 Hearing on Mr Bemba’s claim for compensation, Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08-T-376-ENG),
Pre-Trial Chamber II, 9 May 2019 (‘Compensation Hearing’).
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Court’s request,96 the decimation of his assets97 and the serious nature of
freezing orders, noting the limited recourse made thereto by other internation-
al(ized) criminal tribunals.98 In reply, the Office of the Prosecutor largely con-
fined its submissions to disputing the legal basis of Bemba’s claim, stressing
that he had failed to satisfy the ‘grave and manifest miscarriage of justice’
criterion set forth in Article 85(3) ICC Statute.99
On 20 June 2019, Mr Bemba filed his reply to the responses submitted by
the Prosecutor and the Registry to his claim for compensation,100 in which he
reiterates that his claim does indeed satisfy Article 85(3) ICC Statute,101 that
he is entitled to a resolution of his private law claim102 and that the Registry
mischaracterizes, inter alia, the value of his frozen assets and his ability to
manage them.103 Bemba also requests that the concerned states, namely
Belgium, Portugal and the DRC, should be joined as participants to the pro-
ceedings, or invited to submit written observations thereon.104 On 26 June
2019, the Prosecutor filed a redacted response to Bemba’s reply.105 As with
the submissions made by her Office at the hearing, the Prosecutor’s response
was limited to repudiating Mr Bemba’s arguments in support of his claim that
he suffered ‘a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice’.106 Finally, on 25 July
2019, the Registry submitted its observations on Mr Bemba’s reply.107 Much of
its observations as concerns specific assets are redacted.108 This said, the
Registry underscores that ‘most of the assets claimed had either deteriorated
before Mr Bemba’s arrest or were not frozen or seized on behalf of the Court, or
96 Ibid., at 6, line 11 et seq.
97 Ibid., at 10, line 8 et seq.
98 Ibid., at 11, line 1 et seq. The author disputes the argument by counsel for Mr Bemba that the
ICTY, ICTR and SCSL did not request the freezing of the assets of those under their jurisdic-
tion. The ICTY did so with respect to Slobodan Milosˇevic´, Milan Milutinovic´, Nikola Sˇainovic,
Dragoljub Ojdanic´ and Vlajko Stojiljkovic´; the ICTR Prosecutor did so with respect to Fe´licien
Kabuga; and the SCSL did so with respect to Sam Hinga Norman. For a detailed discussion of
these freezing requests, see D.J. Birkett, ‘Asset Recovery at International(ised) Criminal
Tribunals: Fines, Forfeiture, and Orders for Reparations’, in N.H.B. Jørgensen (ed.), The
International Criminal Responsibility of War’s Funders and Profiteers (Cambridge University
Press, forthcoming).
99 Compensation Hearing, supra note 95, at 18, line 4 et seq.
100 Public Redacted Version of ‘Mr. Bemba’s reply to the Prosecution Response to and Registry
Submissions on ‘‘Mr. Bemba’s claim for compensation and damages’’’, Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/
05-01/08-3687-Red), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 20 June 2019.
101 Ibid., §§ 12–24.
102 Ibid., §§ 25–26.
103 Ibid., §§ 27–43.
104 Ibid., §§ 44–46.
105 Public redacted version of ‘Prosecution’s response to Mr Bemba’s reply on compensation and
damages’, 26 June 2019, ICC-01/05-01/08-3690-Conf, Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08-
3690-Red2), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 21 November 2019.
106 Ibid., §§ 7–33.
107 Public Redacted Version of the ‘Registry’s Observations on Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo’s
Lawyers’ Reply ICC-01/05-01/08-3687-Conf’, Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08- 3689-Red3),
Pre-Trial Chamber II, 25 July 2019.
108 Ibid., §§ 23–41.
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both’.109 As for assets belonging to Mr Bemba that were or remain frozen and/
or seized at the Court’s request, the Registry claims that their management has
been carried out in accordance with the procedures applicable thereto under
the pertinent domestic legislation.110 Lastly, the Registry opposes Bemba’s re-
quest to invite the submissions of the states concerned.111
In sum, Mr Bemba and the Registry interpret the Court’s statutory frame-
work as concerns the freezing of assets in different ways. Bemba is of the view
that the ICC ought to retain a central role in the management of assets frozen
at its request, while the Registry expresses the opinion that it is for the
requested state(s) to discharge this responsibility in the Rome Statute system.
There is no judicial guidance as concerns the management of assets frozen in
accordance with requests for cooperation issued by the ICC. If Trial Chamber
III’s view of the ICC cooperation schema, namely that it is for domestic law to
regulate the (un)freezing of assets frozen at the Court’s request, also applies to
their management, then it is domestic law that must be probed for direction as
to how their value can be preserved during often lengthy proceedings.
3. Domestic Approaches
The ICC Statute is clear that states ought to execute cooperation requests in
accordance with procedures of their respective national laws.112 ICC states
parties are therefore free to legislate as they deem appropriate to enable their
domestic authorities to fulfil requests for cooperation transmitted thereto by the
ICC. In other words, although Article 88 ICC Statute provides that ‘States
Parties shall ensure that there are procedures available under their national
law for all of the forms of cooperation’ specified under Part IX thereof,113 the
treaty provides no guidance as to what these procedures should entail. In the
following section, it will be shown that there are procedures already available
under certain states’ domestic law that could offer guidance for other states in
the management of assets seized and/or frozen at the Court’s behest. Much of
this legislation is analysed by the Open-ended Intergovernmental Working
Group on Asset Recovey (hereinafter: IWG), a subsidiary body of the
Conference of the States Parties to the UN Convention against
Corruption,114 in a 2017 study.115 One of the aims of this study is to enable
those responsible for managing seized and frozen assets ‘to learn from the
experiences of others and avoiding and/or managing some of the risks and
109 Ibid., § 42.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Art. 93(1) ICCSt.
113 Art. 88 ICCSt.
114 Report of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption
on Its First Session, Held in Amman from 10 to 14 December 2006, UN Doc. CAC/COSP/2006/
12, 27 December 2006, at 5–7.
115 Study Prepared by the Secretariat on Effective Management and Disposal of Seized and Confiscated
Assets, UN Doc. CAC/COSP/WG.2/2017/CRP.1, 23 August 2017 (‘IWG Study’).
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challenges involved’.116 Part 2 of the present article has identified some of the
risks inherent to the Rome Statute framework for the management of assets
frozen at the request of the Court. It is hoped that the legislation analysed in
the following paragraphs might provide useful guidance for the mitigation of
these risks in the execution of future requests for cooperation from states in the
freezing of assets.
At this stage, it is important to elaborate the distinction between freezing and
seizure of assets by states at the request of the ICC. First, it is noteworthy that the
terms are not defined in the ICC Statute or the ICC RPE. Guidance can, however, be
found in the UN Convention Against Corruption, which adopts the following
definitions of the terms: ‘‘‘Freezing’’ or ‘‘seizure’’ shall mean temporarily prohibit-
ing the transfer, conversion, disposition or movement of property or temporarily
assuming custody or control of property on the basis of an order issued by a court or
other competent authority.’117 The following section will discuss tools that could
be of use to states during both the freezing and seizure phases of the asset recovery
process, regardless of whether the legislation in question limits their application to
one particular stage.
A. Third-Party Management of Seized or Frozen Assets
Pursuant to the legislation enacted by the UK to give effect to its obligation to
cooperate with the ICC, among other aspects of the ICC Statute regime, appli-
cations for asset freezing ought to be made before the High Court ‘in pursuance
of a direction given by the Secretary of State under section 38’.118 In turn, the
High Court is empowered to appoint a receiver to manage the assets.
According to Schedule 6, section 5(4) International Criminal Court Act
2001: ‘[t]he powers conferred on a receiver . . . shall be exercised with a
view to securing that the property specified in the order is available for satisfy-
ing the forfeiture order or, as the case may be, any forfeiture order that may be
made in the ICC proceedings in relation to which the order was made.’119 In
other words, the High Court may appoint a third party — the ‘receiver’ — to
manage the frozen assets with a view to preventing their depreciation.
Australia,120 Kenya121 and New Zealand122 adopt similar approaches in their
respective national implementing legislation, albeit with the third party bearing
different designations in each of the three common law jurisdictions.123
116 Ibid., at 4.
117 Art. 2(f) UN Convention Against Corruption.
118 International Criminal Court Act 2001, Schedule 6, § 1. See also § 38. For analysis of this
legislation, see R. Cryer and O. Bekou, ‘International Crimes and ICC Cooperation in England
and Wales’, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice (JICJ) (2007) 441–459.
119 International Criminal Court Act 2001, Schedule 6, § 5(4).
120 International Criminal Court Act 2002, § 82; Proceeds of Crime Act 2001, § 38.
121 International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act 2000, § 130; Criminal Proceeds
(Recovery) Act 2009, § 80.
122 International Crimes Act 2008, Schedule 2, § 10 et seq.
123 The third party is labelled ‘the Official Trustee’ in Australia, the ‘Official Assignee’ in New
Zealand and the ‘Public Trustee’ in Kenya.
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It ought to be noted that, despite possessing legislation to give effect to their
obligation under Article 88 ICC Statute, none of the above-mentioned states
parties include (future) orders for reparations among the grounds upon which
orders to freeze or seize assets may be based. This can be contrasted with
Ireland’s national implementing legislation, the International Criminal Court
Act 2006, which also provides for the appointment of a receiver with the power
to take measures to preserve the value of assets.124 In view of the consistent
interpretation by the ICC of Article 57(3)(e) ICC Statute, namely that protective
measures can be taken for the purpose of the enforcement of future reparations
orders,125 this ground ought to be explicitly listed by states in their domestic
procedures facilitating the identification, tracing, freezing and seizure of assets on
behalf of the Court. The Irish national implementing legislation clearly articu-
lates the rationale behind the exercise of the powers of the High Court or a
receiver in giving effect to Article 57(3)(e) ICC Statute, as follows:
[T]he powers shall be exercised with a view to—
1. securing that the property covered by an order . . . is available to satisfy any order of the
International Criminal Court imposing a fine or forfeiture or providing for reparation to,
or in respect of, victims,
2. in the case of realisable property held by a person to whom the defendant has directly or
indirectly made a gift . . ., realising no more than the value for the time being of the gift,
3. allowing any person, other than the defendant or the recipient of any such gift, to retain
or recover the value of any property held by him or her.
In other words, third-party management of assets seized or frozen at the
request of the ICC is designed to protect the interests of victims and bona fide
third parties. At the same time, even though not overtly noted in the foregoing
provision, such procedures also enable third parties to take measures to pre-
serve the value of assets in the interests of the accused person(s) in the event
of an acquittal. In the view of the present author, this is a highly important yet
124 International Criminal Court Act 2006, § 38(4). (‘. . . the High Court may make an order (in
this Part referred to as a ‘‘freezing order’’) prohibiting any person from dealing with the
property of the person to whom the request relates if the Court is satisfied — (i) that this
section applies in relation to the property, and (ii) either — (I) that the International Criminal
Court has imposed a fine, or made a reparation or forfeiture order, in the proceedings con-
cerned, or (II) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that that Court may impose a
fine, or make such an order, in those proceedings’.)
125 See Decision on the Prosecutor’s application for a warrant of arrest, Art. 58, Lubanga Dyilo
(ICC-01/04-01/06-1-Corr-Red), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 10 February 2006, § 134 (‘The
Chamber considers that in light of rule 99 of the Rules, the contextual interpretation of article
57 (3) (e) of the Statute makes clear that the Chamber may, pursuant to article 57 (3) (e) of
the Statute, seek the cooperation of States Parties to take protective measures for the purpose
of securing the enforcement of a future reparation award’); Decision on the implementation of
the request to freeze assets, Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-931), Trial Chamber V(b), 8 July
2014, § 16; Kilolo Lifting Decision, supra note 11, §§ 17 and 18; Judgment on the appeal
of the Prosecutor against the decision of [REDACTED], [REDACTED] (ICC-ACRed-01/16),
Appeals Chamber, 15 February 2016, § 63. For analysis, see Birkett, supra note 2;
Ferstman, supra note 11, at 234–237 (discussing the Lubanga and Kenyatta cases).
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ostensibly overlooked aspect of the protective measures process under Article
57(3)(e) ICC Statute.
B. Use or Sale of Frozen Assets
In addition to the involvement of court-appointed third parties in the manage-
ment of assets seized and/or frozen at the request of the ICC, certain states
have also adopted (both legally binding and non-legally binding) instructions
for those responsible for the management of such assets. For example, in the
UK, section 296(1) Proceeds of Crime Act states, in relevant part, as follows:
‘[i]f cash is detained . . . for more than 48 hours . . ., it is at the first oppor-
tunity to be paid into an interest-bearing account and held there; and the
interest accruing on it is to be added to it on its forfeiture or release’.126 In
respect of depreciable assets, further guidance, in the form of a code of practice
concerning the search, seizure and detention of property, provides:
An appropriate officer should consider the proportionality of detention. This includes the
calculation of the likely costs of storage and insurance as against the value of the property
(particularly depreciating assets) in order to assess whether it is reasonable to continue to
detain the property rather than seek a consent order for its sale or to take steps to release it.
Conversely, this also includes calculating the value of the property against the likely amount
to be found under any confiscation order — steps should be taken to release property should
it exceed the probable value of such a future order.127
One issue raised by Bemba in his claim against the ICC for compensation
and damages is the failure of those responsible for managing his frozen assets
to earn an income from, or to sell, his aircraft.128 It could be beneficial for the
accused (should there be an acquittal) and victims (in the event of a conviction
and consequent reparations order) for certain categories of assets to be actively
utilized, or sold, rather than remaining frozen, and therefore unprofitable, if not
lossmaking, for long periods of time. The IWG identifies a number of kinds of
such assets.129 These include perishable goods, ‘rapidly depreciating’ assets,
property whose maintenance or storage costs are disproportionate to its value,
and assets whose management needs expertise that is not readily available to
the responsible authority.130 Bemba’s Boeing jet, as well as his other frozen
vehicles, whether for use on land, air or sea, would appear to fall into the
‘rapidly depreciating’ category of assets. Additionally, in view of the costs
incurred by parking at Faro airport, there would only have been a short win-
dow of time during which it would have been viable to contend that the
storage costs of this asset were proportionate to its anticipated value. Other
assets that could fall into one of the foregoing categories include live animals
126 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, § 296(1).
127 Code of Practice Issued under Section 47S of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002: Search, Seizure and
Detention of Property (England and Wales), March 2016, § 130.
128 Bemba Claim for Compensation and Damages, supra note 24, at §§ 129–132.
129 IWG Study, supra note 115, at 21–24.
130 Ibid., at 22 and 23.
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(such as racehorses), foodstuffs, fuel, building materials and hazardous
substances.131
Certain ICC states parties legislate for the interim use, or sale, of frozen assets
in this manner. For example, Canada’s Seized Property Management Act
grants the Minister of Public Works and Government Services the following
powers with respect to seized assets:
a. . . . to make an interlocutory sale of perishable or rapidly depreciating property;
b. . . . to destroy . . . property that has little or no value; and
c. . . . to have property, other than real property or a conveyance, forfeited[.]132
Similarly, in the Netherlands, the Public Prosecutor’s Office is permitted to
authorize the sale, destruction, disposal of or use for purposes other than in-
vestigative purposes of objects:
a. which are not suitable for storage;
b. whose storage costs are not in reasonable proportion to their value; [and]
c. which are replaceable and whose value can be easily determined.133
According to the IWG, the Netherlands’ dual-pronged approach of: (i) estab-
lishing a ‘central registration system that allows for swift action to be taken
when costs exceed the value of the asset’ and (ii) adopting ‘an aggressive
strategy of selling off assets pre-confiscation’ permitted the Dutch authorities
to cut the costs of managing movable seized and confiscated assets from E23
million per year to E9 million per year.134 Additionally, such an approach is
in accordance with legislation enacted by the European Union135 and non-
binding principles adopted by the Organization of American States136 and the
G8 Group of States.137 Without speculating as to the redacted content in the
131 Ibid.
132 Seized Property Management Act 1993, § 7(2).
133 Art. 117(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. See also Art. 117(1) Code of Criminal Procedure.
134 IWG Study, supra note 115, at 21.
135 Ibid. See Art. 10 Directive 2014/42/EU, OJ L127/39, 3 April 2014 (‘1. Member States shall
take the necessary measures, for example by establishing centralised offices, a set of specialised
offices or equivalent mechanisms, to ensure the adequate management of property frozen with
a view to possible subsequent confiscation. 2. Member States shall ensure that the measures
referred to in paragraph 1 include the possibility to sell or transfer property where
necessary.’).
136 Ibid. See Organization of American states, Asset Management Systems in Latin America and Best
Practices Document on Management of Seized and Forfeited Assets (2011) at 17 (‘There should be
a law that regulates proceedings that, under conditions established in domestic legislation,
allow the sale of perishable assets or assets that lose their value quickly, such as boats,
airplanes, vehicles, animals and farms with crops. States should also evaluate the possibility
of authorizing the advanced sale of assets that are too costly to maintain.’).
137 Ibid. See G8 Lyon/Roma Group, Criminal Legal Affairs Subgroup, ‘Best Practices for the
Administration of Seized Assets’, 27 April 2005, at 3 (‘Legal proceedings should be possible
to permit, under conditions laid down in national law, pre-judgment sale of assets pending the
outcome of the confiscation/forfeiture proceeding for wasting assets that are perishable or
rapidly declining in value, such as vessels, aircraft, cars, animals and farms with growing
crops. States should further consider authorising pre-judgment sale of assets which are too
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multiple documents filed in support of and in response to Bemba’s claim for
compensation and damages, it is sufficient to say that following such guidelines
(or, in the case of European Union (EU) member states, applying the provisions
of their legislation transposing the pertinent EU Directive into their respective
domestic legal frameworks) ought to diminish the likelihood that further such
claims might be brought before the Court in future. The following section
briefly discusses possible steps that could be taken on the international plane
to avoid or to remedy the mismanagement of assets frozen or seized at the
request of the ICC.
4. International Responses
Andre´ Nollkaemper and Dov Jacobs term shared responsibility as ‘ex post
facto responsibility for contributions to injury’, with a particular focus on
‘situations where collaboration between two or more actors leads to harmful
outcomes’.138 Go¨ran Sluiter further delineates this concept as it applies in the
context of international(ized) criminal tribunals, arguing that, in the context
of institutions, like the ICC, established to deliver international criminal just-
ice, ‘the emphasis lies on the prevention of harm’, i.e. (serious) human rights
violations.139 Having analysed the problem of sharing responsibility between
the (often multiple) relevant actors in three phases of international criminal
proceedings, Sluiter concludes, inter alia, that a ‘number of scenarios were
insufficiently anticipated and regulated’ when framing the ICC Statute and
other sources of applicable law before the Court.140 It is argued here that the
modalities of and responsibility for managing assets frozen at the request of
the ICC should be added to that list. Mismanaging such assets has the po-
tential to (seriously) violate the human rights of the person whose assets are
frozen as well as those of bona fide third parties.141 The following paragraphs
probe three provisions of the Rome Statute which could offer routes through
which the risk of committing such violations might be mitigated.
burdensome to maintain. The resulting proceeds should be secured in accordance with na-
tional law (and the action notified to the court and other affected parties) pending a final
determination of confiscation or forfeiture.’).
138 A. Nollkaemper and D. Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual
Framework’, 34 Michigan Journal of International Law (2013) 359–438, at 365.
139 G. Sluiter, ‘International Criminal Tribunals and their Relation to States’, in A. Nollkaemper
and I. Plakokefalos (eds), The Practice of Shared Responsibility in International Law (Cambridge
University Press, 2017) 212–235, at 215.
140 Ibid., at 232.
141 Nollkaemper and Jacobs explicitly identify the example of ‘infringing the rights of third parties’
in describing what they mean by ‘the term responsibility’. See Nollkaemper and Jacobs, supra
note 138, at 365.
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A. Utilizing Article 96(3) ICC Statute
Simply because Article 88 ICC Statute does not dictate a particular method
that states parties should follow in ensuring the availability of procedures
under their domestic law for all forms of cooperation detailed in Part IX of
the Court’s constituent instrument, this is not to say that the ICC cannot
request states to properly manage assets frozen or seized at its request.
Article 93(1)(k) ICC Statute, read together with Article 93(1)(l) and Article
96 ICC Statute, appears to provide a sound legal basis for such requests inas-
much as these provisions not only empower the ICC to request its states parties
to assist in freezing and seizing assets, but also with ‘[a]ny other type of
assistance which is not prohibited by the law of the requested state, with a
view to facilitating the investigation and prosecution of crimes’ within its jur-
isdiction.142 Should the requested state(s) face problems in executing the
Court’s demand(s) because of domestic law requirements, Article 96(3) ICC
Statute provides for an avenue through which these obstacles could be sur-
mounted, namely consultations between the concerned state(s) and the ICC.143
A document issued by the UN Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee
provides useful guidance in this context: ‘Whatever . . . body is responsible for
regulating frozen assets should make reasonable efforts to do so in a manner
that does not result in their undue deterioration, provided that this does not
conflict with the overall intention behind the freezing action’.144 In the Rome
Statute system, the body responsible for the daily administration of assets
frozen at the request of the ICC is the pertinent authority (or authorities)
within the requested state. But this state of affairs need not prevent the ICC,
whose officials establish the intention(s) behind the freezing action, from acting
in concert with the responsible domestic authorities to ensure that the aims(s)
intended are not thwarted by misunderstandings and/or mismanagement.145
B. Lessons from Article 106 ICC Statute
Article 106 ICC Statute specifies how the enforcement of ICC-determined sen-
tences and the conditions of imprisonment applicable thereto are overseen.
Specifically, Article 106(1) ICC Statute provides that ‘[t]he enforcement of a
sentence of imprisonment shall be subject to the supervision of the Court.’146 It
is argued that a similar arrangement could be particularly well suited to the
management of assets frozen by states following receipt of a cooperation re-
quest from the Court. In other words, the ICC could play a more prominent
role in supervising how frozen assets are managed after the responsible
142 Art. 93(1)(l) ICCSt.
143 Art. 96(3) ICCSt.
144 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, ‘Assets Freeze: Explanation of Terms’, 24 February 2015,
available online at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267 (visited 1 June
2020), § 11.
145 For examples, see Bemba Claim for Compensation and Damages, supra note 24, §§ 147–149.
146 Art. 106(1) ICCSt.
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authorities of the requested state(s) have taken enforcement action pursuant to
the procedures available under their respective national laws. Article 106(2)
ICC Statute could also serve as a guideline in terms of clarifying the standards
against which the state authorities’ management of assets frozen at the Court’s
request ought to be held. The provision stipulates that the ‘conditions of im-
prisonment shall be governed by the law of the state of enforcement and shall
be consistent with widely accepted international treaty standards governing
treatment of prisoners’.147 The Rome Statute already provides that the freezing
of assets in accordance with an ICC-issued cooperation request ought to be
done under the pertinent provisions of national law.148 As for international
standards governing the management of frozen assets, it is acknowledged that
widely accepted treaty standards might be more difficult to identify than those
applicable to the treatment of prisoners. This said, the European Court of
Human Rights and the Inter-American Courts of Human Rights have each
developed principles relevant to the application of asset freezing measures, a
number of which could be germane to the supervision of the management of
assets frozen by states at the ICC’s request.149 The legislation analysed in the
IWG Study and discussed in Part 3 could also offer a useful starting point for
determining the standards applicable to managing such assets.
C. Amending Article 85(3) ICC Statute?
As Stuart Beresford has reasoned, ‘in many criminal jurisdictions innocent
persons who have been prosecuted . . . may be compensated for the . . . eco-
nomic losses they have suffered as a direct result of the proceedings against
them’.150 Dave Michels has further observed that such compensation may be
made available to those who are accused and subsequently acquitted in a
number of national jurisdictions.151 Compensation to acquitted accused also
147 Art. 106(2) ICCSt.
148 Art. 93(1) ICCSt. See also Art. 88 ICCSt.
149 ECtHR, Dzˇinic´ v. Croatia, Appl. No. 38359/13, Judgment, 17 May 2016, §§ 59-82 (finding
that asset freezing measures must be: (i) of an impermanent nature; (ii) lawful; (iii) executed
in pursuit of a legitimate aim and (iv) proportional; IACtHR, Case of Chaparro A´lvarez and Lapo
I´n˜iguez v Ecuador, Judgment, 21 November 2007, §§ 183–218 (holding that such measures
must: (i) be adopted and supervised by a judicial body; (ii) not result in acquitted persons
having to pay fees arising from the management of their seized or frozen assets and (iii) allow
for the prompt release of seized or frozen assets when the reason(s) for the application of the
measures no longer apply). For a more detailed analysis, see D.J. Birkett, ‘Asset Freezing at the
European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights: Lessons for the International Criminal
Court, the United Nations Security Council, and States’, Human Rights Law Review
(forthcoming).
150 S. Beresford, ‘Redressing the Wrongs of the International Justice System: Compensation for
Persons Erroneously Detained, Prosecuted, or Convicted by the Ad Hoc Tribunals’, 96
American Journal of International Law (2002) 628–646, at 628.
151 See J.D. Michels, ‘Compensating Acquitted Defendants for Detention before International
Criminal Courts’, 8 JICJ (2010) 407–424, at 413 (listing Austria, Denmark, Germany,
Iceland, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden as having procedures available
for such compensation).
Managing Frozen Assets at the ICC 785
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jicj/article/18/3/765/5896054 by guest on 29 Septem
ber 2020
forms part of the Rome Statute system, Article 85(3) of which reads: ‘In ex-
ceptional circumstances, where the Court finds conclusive facts showing that
there has been a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice, it may in its dis-
cretion award compensation, according to the criteria provided in the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, to a person who has been released from detention
following a final decision of acquittal or a termination of the proceedings for
that reason.’152 It has been convincingly shown elsewhere153 that Mr Bemba’s
prospects of securing compensation under Article 85(3) ICC Statute are slim,
not least because the provision makes no reference to the mismanagement of
assets. Indeed, according to Kip Hale and Santiago Vargas Nin˜o, to agree with
Bemba’s view that Rule 175 ICC RPE ‘warrants compensation for damage,
devaluation or destruction of property under Article 85(3) would stretch the
‘‘ordinary meaning’’ of these provisions to the point of breaking’.154 Article
85(3) ICC Statute would therefore seem not to offer an especially suitable
avenue for recourse for those alleging the mismanagement of their assets
frozen at the Court’s request. But the narrowness of this provision has been
challenged in the academic literature, albeit outside the context of the man-
agement of frozen assets.
Dave Michels has proposed the addition of the following provision, among
others,155 to follow Article 85(3) ICC Statute: ‘Compensation may be awarded
by a Chamber, where it considers such compensation consistent with the
interests of justice, to a person who has been released from detention following
a final decision of acquittal.’156 Ro´isı´n Mulgrew has made a similar plea for
amendment of the provision, arguing in favour of the removal of the terms
‘grave and manifest’ and ‘exceptional circumstances’.157 These suggestions are
152 Art. 85(3) ICCSt. Rules 173–175 ICC RPE also form part of the system governing compen-
sation to an arrested or convicted person, but remain subordinate to the Rome Statute.
153 See K. Hale and S. Vargas Nin˜o, ‘Unexploded Legal Ordnance’, Opinio Juris, 10 April 2019,
available online at http://opiniojuris.org/2019/04/10/unexploded-legal-ordnance/ (visited 1
June 2020); K.J. Heller ‘Bim, Bam, Bem-Boom!’, Opinio Juris, 12 March 2019, available online
at http://opiniojuris.org/2019/03/12/bim-bam-bemb-oom/ (visited 1 June 2020). On the high
threshold required by Art. 85(3) ICCSt., see Decision on the ‘Requeˆte en indemnisation en
application des dispositions de l’article 85(1) et (3) du Statut de Rome’, Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/
04-02/12-301-tENG), Trial Chamber II, 16 December 2015, § 45; S. Zappala`, ‘Compensation
to an Arrested or Convicted Person’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J.R.W.D. Jones (eds), The
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2002)
1577, at 1583; Beresford, supra note 150, at 643 (discussing the burden of establishing ‘a
grave and manifest miscarriage of justice’, albeit outside the context of the Art. 85(3) ICCSt.
regime); J. van Wijk and B. Hola´, ‘Acquittals in International Criminal Justice: Pyrrhic
Victories?’ 30 LJIL (2017) 241–262, at 257.
154 Hale and Vargas Nin˜o, supra note 153. Rule 175 ICC RPE provides as follows: ‘In establishing
the amount of any compensation in conformity with article 85, paragraph 3, the Chamber
designated under rule 173, sub-rule 1, shall take into consideration the consequences of the
grave and manifest miscarriage of justice on the personal, family, social and professional
situation of the person filing the request.’
155 Michels, supra note 151, at 423.
156 Ibid.
157 R. Mulgrew, ‘The Costs of Suspicion: A Critical Analysis of the Compensation Scheme
Established by Article 85(3) of the Rome Statute’, in R. Mulgrew and D. Abels (eds),
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not confined to academic debate, with the delegations to the 1998 Rome
Conference expressing disagreement as to the breadth of this provision, as
follows: ‘[t]here are delegations which believe that there should not be an
unfettered right to compensation where a person is acquitted or released prior
to the end of the Trial. . . . Other delegations considered this text to be too
restrictive.’158 There might therefore be some appetite for amending this pro-
vision, although it is acknowledged that few changes have been made to the
treaty since its adoption in the Italian capital.
What, then, can be done to rectify this unfortunate situation? Hale and
Vargas Nin˜o argue that the ICC ought to use the occasion to ‘consider
cross-organ supervision over frozen assets and like matters, as well as devel-
oping methods to maintain transparent two-way communication with relevant
state authorities’.159 As proposed in the present article, the Rome Statute al-
ready contains a means through which the latter might be realized, namely
Article 96(3) ICC Statute. It is also argued that the division of labour between
the Court and requested states should be clarified as far as the management of
seized and frozen assets is concerned. Is the involvement of the ICC limited to
an oversight role after the cooperation request has been issued? Or ought the
Court, through the Registry, play a more proactive role in the management of
frozen assets in view of the various competing interests (which include those of
the accused, bona fide third parties, potential victims and the prosecution)
concerned in the protective measures process? It is the view of the present
author that, at a minimum, the ICC must share responsibility with the
requested states for the management of assets frozen pursuant to the Rome
Statute.160 As argued in the preceding paragraphs, the regime governing the
supervision of the enforcement of ICC-determined sentences could serve as
inspiration for establishing such a framework. If, like the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the ICC can be said to be ‘like
a giant without arms and legs . . . [which] needs artificial limbs to walk and
work’,161 the state authorities that act as those limbs are part of a wider body,
which includes the Court.
5. Conclusion
In his claim for compensation and damages, Mr Bemba notes that he was
acquitted on 8 June 2018 and advocates that, ‘[i]n a perfect world, the
Research Handbook on the International Penal System (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) 476–
477, at 445.
158 Working Paper on Art. 84, A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.74, 11 July 1998, fn. 3. See also Hale
and Vargas Nin˜o, supra note 153; Mulgrew, supra note 157, at 477.
159 Hale and Vargas Nin˜o, supra note 153.
160 For a similar opinion, see Heller, supra note 153.
161 A. Cassese, ‘On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of
Breaches of International Humanitarian Law’, 9 European Journal of International Law
(1998) 2–17, at 13.
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Appeals Chamber should have made orders relating to the freezing of . . . assets
eiusdem generis to those sought herein’.162 Clarity on the part of the Court in
this regard could have avoided the need for further filings on behalf of Mr
Bemba. In the absence of such orders, this article has sought to shed light on
the fallout of the Bemba acquittal as far as his frozen assets are concerned. In
so doing, it has been shown that lacunae exist in the legal framework applic-
able to the management of frozen assets under the Rome Statute system. At
the very least, the filings issued in the aftermath of Bemba’s acquittal show
that the division of labour between the (organs of) the Court and the states
parties to its constituent instrument could be made clearer in this crucial
sphere of its operations.
The risk that assets will depreciate in value during the pre-trial, trial and
appeal processes at the ICC and, indeed, at other international(ized) criminal
tribunals, is arguably greater than at the domestic level because of the aver-
age length of these processes. This could render states’ national legislation as
concerns the freezing and management of assets less than ideally suited for
application in response to requests for cooperation from the Court under the
Rome Statute. This article has sought to identify procedures available under
certain states’ domestic law that might provide stimulation for those states in
the process of adopting legislation allowing their national authorities to co-
operate with the ICC. It is conceivable that, in deciding on Bemba’s claim for
compensation and damages, Pre-Trial Chamber II will follow the reasoning
adopted by Trial Chamber III in determining Bemba’s application to have his
assets partially unfrozen, i.e. that states’ national legislation governs the
freezing of assets at the behest of the ICC. If Pre-Trial Chamber II is of the
opinion that this relationship also applies to the management of assets frozen
at the Court’s request, then states should ensure that their national imple-
menting legislation allows their responsible domestic authorities to preserve
the value of any frozen or seized assets throughout the routinely protracted
proceedings at the international level. At the same time, there are avenues
through which the ICC and the Assembly of states parties to the Rome
Statute could work to ameliorate the present state of affairs, namely by max-
imizing the opportunity provided by Article 96(3) ICC Statute, by learning
from the regime established by Article 106 ICC Statute and by considering
amendments to Article 85(3) ICC Statute.
Had Mr Bemba been convicted on appeal, it is entirely plausible that
victims’ representatives could have made similar representations to those
filed by Bemba in the instant case, claiming instead that his frozen
assets should have been better managed with a view to their being used to
secure the enforcement of a reparations award against him. Equally, having
been acquitted on appeal of all charges of crimes against humanity and war
crimes levied against him by the ICC Prosecutor, Bemba ought to be put in a
position resembling that which he occupied prior to his (arrest and) assets
being frozen, minus any expenses incurred during proceedings. It is only by
162 Bemba Unfreezing Application, supra note 33, § 51.
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acting in concert that the ICC and its states parties can ensure that the value
of assets frozen pursuant to the Rome Statute is preserved, regardless of who
the ultimate beneficiaries of adopting such an approach may be.
6. Postscript
Pre-Trial Chamber II rendered its decision on Mr Bemba’s claim for compen-
sation and damages on 18 May 2020.163 Consistent with the focus of most of
the filings submitted throughout the litigation discussed in this article, much of
the Pre-Trial Chamber’s analysis focused on whether the claim at hand sat-
isfied Article 85(3) ICC Statute,164 with only a few paragraphs dedicated to Mr
Bemba’s claim that the ICC mismanaged his frozen assets.165 In short, Pre-
Trial Chamber II concluded that it had no jurisdiction over this component of
Mr Bemba’s request because the claim fell outside the scope of its mandate
under Article 85 ICC Statute.166 The Pre-Trial Chamber did, however, expli-
citly note that this decision was ‘without prejudice to Mr Bemba’s right to
pursue other procedural remedies’ in connection with this element of his
claim.167 Mr Bemba has since sought leave to appeal the Pre-Trial
Chamber’s decision under Article 82(1)(d) ICC Statute.168
In reaching its decision it is conceivable that Pre-Trial Chamber II might
have found itself between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, if it had
found the Court to be at fault in managing Mr Bemba’s assets, not only might
he have been entitled to a large sum of money by way of compensation, but
the accompanying reputational damage to the ICC could also have been sig-
nificant. On the other hand, if the Pre-Trial Chamber had found that the blame
for the diminished value of Mr Bemba’s assets lay at the feet of the three states
responsible for their freezing, this might have resulted in negative consequen-
ces for the Court’s relationship with these states, thereby rendering cooperation
less forthcoming in the future. In the end, by finding that the second compo-
nent of Mr Bemba’s claim fell beyond the scope of Article 85 ICC Statute, the
Pre-Trial Chamber did neither, although it did appear to absolve the Registry of
any fault in ‘in acting as a channel of communication between the Court and
the requested Three States’.169 If Mr Bemba’s application for leave to appeal
succeeds, it is the hope of the present author that the Appeals Chamber is able
to shed some much-needed further light on the division of labour between the
Court and cooperating States as far as managing frozen assets is concerned.
For example, although Pre-Trial Chamber II observed that ‘the responsibility
163 Decision on Mr Bemba’s claim for compensation and damages, Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/
08-3694), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 18 May 2020 (‘Bemba Pre-Trial Chamber Decision’).
164 Ibid., §§ 18–52.
165 Ibid., §§ 53–64.
166 Ibid., § 61.
167 Ibid., § 64.
168 Request for leave to appeal the ‘Decision on Mr Bemba’s claim for compensation and dam-
ages’, Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08-3695), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 25 May 2020.
169 Bemba Pre-Trial Chamber Decision, supra note 163, § 58.
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for the proper execution of a cooperation request emanating from the Court
rests primarily with the requested States’,170 it is argued that the terms
‘proper’ and ‘primarily’ are both in need of elaboration, not least in view of
the rights of the accused at stake in this process.
If clarification is not forthcoming on this front, whether because Mr Bemba’s
request for leave to appeal is not granted or if it succeeds but the Appeals
Chamber reaches a similar conclusion to that of Pre-Trial Chamber II on the
question of jurisdiction, then it is for the states parties to the ICC Statute to act.
In its decision on Mr Bemba’s claim for compensation, the Pre-Trial Chamber
laudably draws attention to the arguably excessive length of proceedings (and
Mr Bemba’s time in custodial detention) in the present case and even intimates
that the Court’s constituent instrument, including but not limited to Article
85(3) ICC Statute, should be reviewed in order to better protect the rights
afforded to accused persons therein.171 If such a review is undertaken and,
in the words of the Pre-Trial Chamber, ‘if the Court’s aim is to serve as a
beacon at the forefront of all matters pertaining to individual human rights’,172
then surely the issue of who bears responsibility for the proper management of
assets frozen at the ICC’s request, and the modalities of their unfreezing after
an acquittal, is deserving of attention.
170 Ibid., § 57.
171 Ibid., §§ 67–68.
172 Ibid., § 68.
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